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Motivating Enforcement: Institutional
Culture and the Clean Water Act
WILLIAM L. ANDREEN*
SYNOPSIS:
Vigorous enforcement is a critical component of any credible
environmental protection program. Congress recognized that fact
when it enacted the Clean Water Act in 1972. The Act, therefore,
contains an enforceable pollution control scheme, more than ade-
quate federal enforcement tools, and calls upon the states and pri-
vate citizens to aid in the enforcement of the Act. Unfortunately,
enforcement efforts have lapsed several times in the recent past.
This article explores a form of self-regulation that would create an
ex ante limit on politically motivated attempts to undermine the
Act through non-enforcement. While not fail-proof, the full blos-
soming of a proud, independent law enforcement culture within
the enforcement staff itself may be one of the most feasible ways
to maintain a stable and vital enforcement program.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the United States Congress enacted one of the most
complex and revolutionary pieces of legislation in its history. The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act ("the Clean Water Act" or
"the Act")1 made the federal government the dominant authority
in an area where the states had long held primacy. It created a
new uniform system of technology-based effluent limitations that
would demand the same basic level of treatment for a particular
industry, regardless of whether it was located in New York or
Georgia, Oregon, or Louisiana. Industries could no longer block
* Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law;
B.A., The College of Wooster; J.D., Columbia University. An earlier version of this
article was presented to the 2006 Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of Environmental
Law at Pace University Law School on October 16, 2006 and to the Environmental
and Land Use Law Workshop at Georgetown University Law School on November 6,
2006. The author is grateful for the comments received at each of the presentations
as well as additional comments from Bob Kuehn.
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000)).
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state pollution control efforts by threatening to relocate to more
lenient jurisdictions. Discharge limitations could no longer be
based on the capacity of a water body to meet state water quality
standards, which in some cases protected no use beyond the
water's utility for industrial or agricultural usage. 2 State water
quality standards, however, were retained, expanded, and
strengthened in order to supplement the technology-based limita-
tions by protecting heavily used waters or waters with relatively
low flows. 3
To implement these new technology-based limitations and
any more stringent limits necessary to meet state water quality
standards, every point source discharger, municipal as well as in-
dustrial, was required to obtain a permit and comply with its
terms and conditions. These permits transformed the general re-
quirements of the Act into specific obligations that set forth pre-
cise numerical limits for each discharger at the point of discharge.
The task of compliance as well as enforcement was thus greatly
simplified. Proof of harm to the aquatic environment or any spe-
cific violation of ambient water standards was no longer required.
Instead, one only had to compare the permittee's actual discharge
with its permitted limits.
This concern with enforcement and enforceability permeated
the design of the entire Act. The primary reason that Congress
focused so intently upon enforcement lies in the history of prior
federal attempts to control water pollution. The pre-1972 federal
water pollution control program4 had languished for years due to
spotty and ineffectual efforts to exact compliance with its water
quality objectives. 5 Thoroughly disenchanted with that pattern of
impotence, Congress set out to cure the problem, not only by es-
tablishing an enforceable pollution control strategy, but also by
strengthening the enforcement process itself.
2. William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United
States-State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part 11, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
215, 286 (2003) [hereinafter Andreen, Evolution of Water Pollution Control: Part II].
3. See id. at 276.
4. For a discussion of federal involvement in water pollution control prior to
1972, see generally N. William Hines, Nor Any Drop To Drink: Public Regulation of
Water Quality Part III: The Federal Effort, 52 IOWA L. REV. 799 (1967); Andreen,
Evolution of Water Pollution Control: Part II, supra note 2.
5. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 5 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE




The Clean Water Act of 1972 gave the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") enormous power to enforce by means of
administrative orders 6 (a power augmented in 1987 by the author-
ity to assess administrative penalties),7 referrals of civil cases to
the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") for penalties and
injunctive relief,8 and referrals of criminal cases to DOJ for prose-
cution.9 Congress also preserved an important role for state gov-
ernment under the Act. In addition to setting water quality
standards, states may obtain permission to administer and en-
force the Act's permit program within their borders.10 Such state
enforcement power, however, is not exclusive. In states with au-
thorized permit programs, the EPA's enforcement is concurrent
with that of the states." This redundant approach to enforcement
power, moreover, does not end with joint governmental custody.
Congress also empowered private citizens to file civil cases against
those alleged to be in violation of the Act.
12
Congress did not create this system of overlapping enforce-
ment authority by accident. It was a deliberate reaction to earlier
instances of enforcement lethargy. It was an expression of Con-
gress' skepticism about the ability or willingness of the EPA or
any other single agency to continuously and vigorously enforce the
law. 13 The Act, therefore, added a second governmental layer to
the enforcement mix, taking advantage of the opportunities
presented by the nation's federal structure. Furthermore, even
beyond these two governmental layers, the Act also called upon
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (2000).
7. Id. § 1319(g).
8. Id. § 1319(b).
9. Id. § 1319(c). A conviction subjects a violator to fines and imprisonment. Id.
It also subjects a violator to debarment from federal contracting. Id. § 1368.
10. Id. § 1342(b).
11. See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional
Prescription for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 202, 218 (1987) [hereinafter Andreen, Clean Water Act Enforcement].
12. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
13. Congress' skeptical attitude towards agency fidelity to its statutory design
was expressed in other ways as well. The Act, therefore, contains a long series of
mandatory duties, regulatory schedules, and deadlines all designed to thwart bureau-
cratic inaction and the possibility that future administrations might attempt to un-
dermine the Act's carefully articulated regulatory program. See William L. Andreen,
The Evolving Law of Environmental Protection in the United States: 1970-1991, 9
ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 96, 98-100 (1992) [hereinafter Andreen, Evolving Law of Envi-
ronmental Protection]. Congress' use of such prophylactic mechanisms was not moti-
vated only by prior experience or a perception that agencies were prone to capture.
Congress, dominated by Democratic majorities, also distrusted the willingness of a
Republican Nixon administration to faithfully execute the law. Id. at 98.
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citizens to act as private attorneys general to either induce or sup-
plement enforcement action by both layers of government. 14 In
this way, Congress reduced the possibility of what Professor Wil-
liam Buzbee has called "regulatory underkill," which can result
from the failure to adequately enforce a statutory scheme. 15
The Clean Water Act, however, did not stop with merely cre-
ating various layers of governmental and private enforcement.
Through this Act, Congress also attempted to cabin the kind of
enforcement discretion that administrative agencies typically en-
joy. While Congress gave the EPA discretion in deciding whether
or not to refer a civil case to DOJ,16 the Act provides that the EPA
"shall," upon the finding of a violation, issue an administrative
compliance order, unless it has either referred the matter to DOJ
or a state (in the case of a state-issued permit) has brought appro-
priate enforcement action.1 7 Despite this mandate, however,
statements contained in the legislative history suggest that Con-
gress believed that the EPA would retain enough discretion to en-
able it to focus its limited administrative enforcement resources
upon serious cases.18 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the federal courts
have been largely reluctant to entertain cases challenging EPA
enforcement inaction. The majority of such cases have held that
the EPA's duty to issue compliance orders is not mandatory,' 9 re-
flecting the traditional view that the courts are inappropriate fora
in which to review an agency's failure to enforce. 2
0
Agencies certainly do need to exercise a certain amount of dis-
cretion in their enforcement programs. This discretion is not only
necessary but also inevitable. 2' Agencies must be able to tailor
their programs to specific priorities and targets; they must be able
14. See JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL
POLLUTION CONTROL LAwS 4 (1987).
15. William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENvrL.
L.J. 108, 108 (2005) [hereinafter Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism].
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (merely authorizing the commencement of civil action).
17. Id. § 1319(a)(1), (3); see also Andreen, Clean Water Act Enforcement, supra
note 11, at 208-09, 239-41.
18. See Andreen, Clean Water Act Enforcement, supra note 11, at 227-28, 241.
19. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2001); Dubois v.
Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 951 (8th Cir. 1987); Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485, 491
(5th Cir. 1977). But see S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 134
(D.S.C. 1978); Save the Valley, Inc. v. EPA, 99 F. Supp. 2d 981, 985 (S.D. Ind. 2000)
(construing a similar provision in the Act).
20. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
21. See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation: Is Enforce-
ment Discretion the Answer?, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1327, 1374 (2004) [hereinafter Recht-
schaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation].
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to husband their resources in prudent fashion, weighing the
probabilities of eventual success; 22 they must be able to be flexible
in the use of formal and informal enforcement mechanisms; and
they must, above all, be reasonable and fair. 23 Discretion, how-
ever, can be abused, and Congress anticipated that fact when it
drafted the Clean Water Act. It feared, with good reason, that not
all future administrations or Congresses would be sympathetic
with the goals of the Act or its vigorous enforcement.
EPA enforcement, unfortunately, is quite vulnerable to ad-
ministrative or political manipulation because the level and qual-
ity of EPA enforcement activity is not particularly transparent.24
No trip wire is breached, no public notice is given, and no report is
transmitted to Congress when zeal falters and EPA enforcement
efforts fade. On the whole, environmental enforcement is a rela-
tively humdrum, bureaucratic affair-clearly unlike the promul-
gation or rescission of regulations, which is subject to public notice
and comment.25 Enforcement, therefore, is an attractive target,
due to its obscurity, for an administration or a Congress intent on
undermining an Act with which it fundamentally disagrees.
Rather than risk defeat and public opprobrium in an attempt to
directly amend the Clean Water Act, opponents are far more likely
to utilize "indirect, less visible techniques" to undercut the Act.
26
Such back door approaches to "regulatory reform" are virtually
the only devices available to opponents of environmental regula-
tion when the public continues-as it has for decades-to strongly
support environmental protection.
27
EPA enforcement of the Clean Water Act has suffered
through three such periods of diminished enforcement intensity,
twice falling victim to administration policy and once to congres-
22. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
23. See generally KENNETH CuLp DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY 17 (1969) (discussing the need to tailor results to the unique facts of particu-
lar cases); Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation, supra note 21, at
1334 (noting that EPA enforcers "do not rigidly or uniformly enforce the law in a one-
size-fits-all approach").
24. See Robert R. Kuehn, Remedying the Unequal Enforcement of Environmental
Laws, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 625, 640 (1994) ("few areas of the law.., are
more hidden from the public's view and oversight than an agency's enforcement
actions").
25. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (setting forth the pro-
cedure for the promulgation of informal rules).
26. See generally William W. Buzbee, Regulatory Underkill in an Era of Anti-En-
vironmental Majorities, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCER-
TAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 142 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2005).
27. Id. at 141.
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sional hostility. The first lapse in EPA enforcement occurred dur-
ing the early years of the Reagan administration. President
Reagan, convinced that regulatory costs were too high, attempted
to make environmental law more business friendly.28 At the EPA,
this meant that enforcement was to be "nonconfrontational. 29 In-
formal efforts to spur voluntary compliance became the order of
the day and any civil referrals from a regional office to headquar-
ters became "black mark[s]" against enforcement personnel. 30 In
addition, EPA and state enforcement resources fell. Between
1980 and 1983, the EPA's enforcement budget plummeted 39%31
and federal aid to state programs fell 29%.32 The size of the EPA's
pollution enforcement staff, consequently, dropped 35% between
1980 and 1984. 33 As if that was not bad enough, the staff that
remained had to endure several reorganizations, which many
viewed as attempts to downgrade enforcement. 34 All of this had a
predictable impact on morale and enforcement efforts. Between
1980 and 1982, civil referrals to DOJ declined 47%, and adminis-
trative actions under the EPA's two most important statutes, the
Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, 35 decreased by nearly
50%.36
The Reagan era enforcement hiatus came to an end in 1984-
not long after the fall of twenty of the EPA's top political appoin-
tees, all victims of a festering scandal surrounding possible politi-
cal manipulation of hazardous waste clean-up actions and refusal
28. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 98 (2004)
[hereinafter LAzARus, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
29. See JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD
CHOICES 42 (1995) [hereinafter MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA].
30. Id.
31. See MARSHAL R. GOODMAN & MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON, MANAGING REGULA-
TORY REFORM: THE REAGAN STRATEGY AND ITS IMPACT 132 (1987).
32. EPA provided approximately $329 million to state programs in 1980. See De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Appropriations
for 1982: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 97th
Cong. 281, 287, 535, 641, 709, 759 (1981). By 1983, that had dwindled to $239 mil-
lion. See Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies Ap-
propriations for 1985: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Appropriations, 98th Cong. 470, 547, 613, 659, 709 (1984).
33. GOODMAN & WRIGHTSON, supra note 31, at 132.
34. See id.
35. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
36. Between 1980 and 1982, the number of administrative actions initiated by
EPA under the two statutes (and the Safe Drinking Water Act) fell from 655 to 350.
See OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE MONITORING, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT: FY 1989 app. (1990).
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to comply with a congressional subpoenaA7 The agency and its
enforcement credibility, however, had been severely damaged by
this extreme politicization. 38 The scars would take years to heal.
The second period of retrenchment in environmental enforce-
ment came after the 1994 election of a Republican majority to both
houses of Congress. Dedicated to cutting government and freeing
the market, the new Republican leadership targeted federal envi-
ronmental law for "significant curtailment."39 Although the anti-
environmental forces on Capitol Hill eventually failed to produce
significant legislative change, 40 the anti-regulatory mood they cre-
ated during these years did have a significant impact on environ-
mental enforcement at the EPA. Influenced, perhaps intimidated
by this mood on Capitol Hill, many members of President Clin-
ton's leadership team at the EPA became more cautious in terms
of enforcement. 41 They introduced a new emphasis upon compli-
ance assistance and various incentive programs, which siphoned
resources from traditional enforcement and confused the staff
about the agency's direction.42 In addition, a major reorganization
of the enforcement program-necessary to consolidate the
agency's enforcement functions, which had been split among nu-
merous offices during the Reagan era-also contributed to a slow-
ing of enforcement momentum. 43 Between 1994 and 1995, civil
referrals to DOJ fell 50%, and civil referrals remained 31% below
1994 levels in 1996. 4 4 Total enforcement actions, moreover, were
18% below 1994 levels in 1995 and fell to 35% below 1994 levels in
37. See Norman J. Vig, The President and the Environment: Revolution or Re-
treat?, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA 77, 91 (Nor-
man J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1984).
38. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Fed-
eral Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 347 (1991).
39. See LAzARus, MAKING ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, supra note 28, at 129.
40. Id. at 131.
41. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, supra note 15, at 123-24 ("An
embattled EPA during the mid-years of the Clinton administration was ... seldom
'gung-ho' regarding enforcement.").
42. See Joel A. Mintz, "Neither the Best of Times Nor the Worst of Times" EPA
Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,390, 10,392-94 (2005) [hereinafter Mintz, Enforcement During the Clinton
Administration].
43. See id. at 10,395-98.
44. There were 430 civil referrals in 1994, 214 in 1995, and 295 in 1996. OFFICE
OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENFORCE-
MENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT: FY 1997 A-5 (1998)
[hereinafter 1997 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT].
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1996. 4 5 Although enforcement stabilized in 1997 by returning to
1994 levels,46 misunderstanding and confusion had been sown
throughout the regulated community.
The third and most recent decline in enforcement vigor came
early in the administration of President George W. Bush when the
EPA's enforcement staff interpreted a number of statements and
actions by the agency's new political appointees as indicating that
enforcement "would be given short shrift" in the coming years.47
As a result, the agency's enforcement efforts foundered. Between
1997 and 2002, EPA referrals to DOJ under the Clean Water Act
fell 55%.48 Total civil referrals were down 41% and remained from
37% to 39% below 1997 levels from 2003 through 2005. 49 Between
1997 and 2002, total enforcement activity dropped 27%; by 2004,
however, a rise in administrative orders returned total enforce-
ment figures to normal levels.50
Although redundant enforcement mechanisms create the
tools through which states could, theoretically, pick up the slack
during periods of reduced federal effort, experience indicates
that-in general at least-states have not done S0.51 During the
45. In 1994, there were a total of 4194 actions taken by EPA (including criminal
and civil referrals, administrative compliance orders, and administrative penalty
complaints), whereas there were 3439 such actions in 1995 and 2728 in 1996. See id.
at A-3 to A-5.
46. See Mintz, Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, supra note 42, at
10,401.
47. See Joel A. Mintz, "Treading Water": A Preliminary Assessment of EPA En-
forcement During the Bush II Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,912, 10,914 (2004) [hereinafter Mintz, Enforcement During the Bush II Adminis-
tration]. EPA's enforcement resources were also reduced in recent years. Between
2001 and 2003, EPA's enforcement and inspection staff was pruned by over 12%. See
Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation, supra note 21, at 1347.
48. See James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen
Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 40 (2003) [hereinafter May, Trends].
49. Civil referrals fell from 426 in 1997 to 252 in 2002, 268 in 2003, 265 in 2004,
and 259 in 2005. Compare 1997 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 44, at A-5,
with OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENvTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FY 2005 COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT ANNUAL RESULTS 7 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter 2005 EPA ENFORCEMENT RESULTS].
50. EPA took a total of 4131 enforcement actions in 1997 whereas the total was
3035 in 2002 and 4194 in 2004. Compare 1997 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra
note 44, at A-3 to A-5 (civil and criminal referrals, administrative compliance orders,
and administrative penalty complaints), with 2005 EPA ENFORCEMENT RESULTS,
supra note 49, at 7, 9, 11 (not including another 200 or so criminal referrals since EPA
no longer reports those numbers).
51. A fall in federal environmental zeal creates opportunities for environmen-
tally-inclined states to supplement federal enforcement. Buzbee, Contextual Environ-
mental Federalism, supra note 15, at 116. Unfortunately, while some states may act
to fill the breach, it appears as if most have failed to do so.
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Reagan era enforcement hiatus of the early 1980s, for example,
state enforcement and inspection activity actually fell.52 The
trend has been even worse during the last fifteen years. State
agency referrals of civil cases to their state attorneys general fell
every year (except for one) from 1993 to 2001, resulting in an over-
all decline of 55%-from a total of 690 to 320.53 In 1995 and 1996,
years when the EPA was experiencing a significant drop in en-
forcement, state administrative enforcement slipped 13% from
1994 levels in 1995 and 17% in 1996. 54 Despite an improvement
in 1997 and 1998, state administrative enforcement again de-
creased between 1998 and 2001, this time a precipitous 40%.55
Professor Clifford Rechtschaffen also reports, that a number of re-
cent studies have identified serious structural flaws in many state
enforcement programs. These include a "failure to carry out in-
spections, failure to take timely and appropriate enforcement ac-
tions, and failure to obtain meaningful penalties, including
penalties that recover the economic benefit of noncompliance.
''56
Although declines in state and federal enforcement greatly
hinder acts intended to protect the environment, the vitality of en-
vironmental enforcement could be restored, in part at least, by ro-
bust citizen suit activity. Such was the case during the Reagan
administration when environmental organizations brought hun-
dreds of cases to enforce the terms of the Clean Water Act.5 7 Since
52. See Jeffrey G. Miller, The Decline and Fall of EPA Enforcement, ENVTL. ANA-
LYST, Aug. 1983, at 5; see also Rochelle L. Stanfield, Ruckelshaus Casts EPA as "Go-
rilla" in States' Enforcement Closet, NAT'L J., May 26, 1984, at 1034, 1034-35 ("'Unless
[the states] have a gorilla in the closet, they can't do the job. And the gorilla is EPA
.... The states can't enforce these laws by themselves. They need us. They'll com-
plain and scream, but if they don't have us, they are dead.'" (quoting former EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus)).
53. See May, Trends, supra note 48, at 46.
54. The states initiated 9785 administrative actions in 1995 and 9306 in 1996 as
compared to 11,881 in 1994. See 1997 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 44, at
A-6.
55. See May, Trends, supra note 48, at 46.
56. Clifford Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Twenty-First
Century: Harnessing the Power of the Public Spotlight, 55 ALA. L. REV. 775, 784 (2004)
[hereinafter Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act]. See David L. Markell,
The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Reinvented" State /Federal Relation-
ship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 43-51 (2000)
(discussing these deficiencies at length). A few states, however, have actually
strengthened their enforcement programs in recent years. See Rechtschaffen, Enforc-
ing the Clean Water Act, supra, at 785.
57. See ENVTL. LAW INST., CITIZEN SUITS: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENFORCEMENT
ACTION UNDER EPA-ADMINISTERED STATUTES vi-vii (1984); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 997 (4th ed. 2003).
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then, however, the federal courts have placed numerous obstacles
in the paths of citizens who seek to enforce environmental laws.
58
Perhaps as a consequence, 25% fewer notices of intent to file suit
were sent in 2002 than in 1995. 59 Actual citizen suits logged by
DOJ under the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts reveal a 38% fall
in 2002 from the prior eight year high.60 Citizen suits, however,
remain significant. The forty-eight citizen suits that were logged
under the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts in 200261 actually com-
pares fairly well with a recent ten-year average of the EPA's civil
referrals under both Acts-176 referrals per year.62 Citizen suits
to enforce environmental law remain an important supplement to
government action; they are not, however, a replacement.
Breakdowns in federal enforcement seriously undercut law
enforcement efforts, produce confusion in the regulated commu-
nity, encourage non-compliance, and subject the EPA to ridicule.
63
Such lapses also breach an implied social contract with those reg-
ulated entities who, relying upon responsible enforcement, have
invested substantial amounts of time and money to comply with
the law. More importantly, however, the lack of effective federal
enforcement breaks faith with the Congress that enacted the
Clean Water Act and breaches the government's obligations to the
regulatory beneficiaries of the Act-the public. The EPA, in short,
has a duty to enforce the law. While this obligation is infused
with great discretion, that discretion does not include the power to
treat enforcement as if it were an open policy question. The Act
has been passed; the regulations promulgated; and permits is-
sued. Enforcement discretion, therefore, should not be treated as
an additional bite of the policy apple. It should be treated as a law
enforcement not a law-making exercise.
The EPA's law enforcement responsibility and the complexi-
ties of its exercise are respected by the courts; consequently,
58. See May, Trends, supra note 48, at 21-22.
59. See id. at 21.
60. Forty-eight citizen enforcement cases were logged in 2002 compared with sev-
enty-eight in 1996. Id. at 25.
61. Id.
62. See 1997 EPA Enforcement Report, supra note 44, at A-5 (1988 to 1997). Rel-
atively few cases are filed under state citizen suit provisions. Approximately half of
the states do not have any such provisions, and, among the states that do, most fail to
provide attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs. See James R. May, The Availability of
State Environmental Citizen Suits, 18 NAT. REsoURCES & ENV'T 53, 56 (2004).
63. An effective enforcement program needs continuity. See IAN AYREs & JOHN




judges generally shy away from reviewing the exercise of EPA en-
forcement discretion in the absence of clear language removing or
otherwise channeling that discretion.6 4 The EPA has thus been
empowered with tremendous and, in the view of most courts, judi-
cially unreviewable authority to refrain from enforcing the Clean
Water Act in a particular instance. This power, however, is in-
fused with a duty to protect the beneficiaries of the Act, a duty
which holds the agency accountable for the exercise of this author-
ity. The duty includes fidelity to the law and prudence in its en-
forcement-good faith, fairness, impartiality, independence,
consistency, and professional competence.
In light of the great power given to the EPA, its enforcement
attorneys and engineers should clearly define their roles in terms
of the ideals and behavioral norms that reflect tough, professional
law enforcement. Imbued with such a professional culture and
tradition, the staff should be less sensitive and more resistant to
the changing tides of political fortune. Their function, after all, is
not policy formulation-which in most cases is subject to judicial
review 6 5-but law enforcement. The EPA has an excellent, dedi-
cated enforcement staff. Perhaps, however, because they are lo-
cated within a non-independent executive branch agency with
significant policy making responsibilities that is often embroiled
in great political controversies, it is sometimes difficult for these
law enforcers to be viewed, or even to view themselves, as part of a
professional law enforcement entity.
The challenge thus is how to nurture and sustain a tough,
consistent, but fair enforcement tradition at the EPA. With so
much scholarly and policy attention directed at how to best moti-
vate the business community to comply with the law, 66 it is time
to direct at least some attention at how to best motivate those who
serve the law through enforcement. It is a difficult, complex, and
often controversial job. Vigorous enforcement wins the EPA staff
few friends in the regulated community while lapses in aggressive
64. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834-38 (1985).
65. See William L. Andreen, Administrative Rulemaking in the United States: An
Examination of the Values that Have Shaped the Process, 66 CANBERRA BULL. OF PUB.
ADMIN., Oct. 1991, at 112-18.
66. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL
MINE SAFETY (1985); KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION
AND THE SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION (1984); EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KA-
CAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982);
Neil A. Gunningham et al., Motivating Management: Corporate Compliance in Envi-
ronmental Protection, 27 LAW & POL'Y 289 (2005).
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enforcement bring stinging public criticism. It must seem at
times to EPA staff as if they can never do the right thing. These
professionals, however, are the unsung heroes of environmental
law, and they are entitled to support in their efforts to enforce the
law.
Before exploring this thesis at more length, the article will
deal with two preliminary matters. Since many readers may not
be familiar with the intricacies of the Clean Water Act, the Article
first sets forth a more elaborate, but, nevertheless, brief discus-
sion of the Act and its enforcement mechanisms. The article then
examines the historical record at more length, focusing upon the
sensitivity of EPA enforcement to changing political tides; the way
in which discretion has been generally used in EPA enforcement;
and the growing emphasis upon compliance assistance and other
incentive programs that is found in both state and federal enforce-
ment programs. After thus setting the stage, the Article will re-
turn to the problem of trying to ensure, to the extent possible,
stability and continuity in the EPA's enforcement of the Clean
Water Act.
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Regulatory Scheme
Although comprehensive federal efforts aimed at controlling
water pollution date back to 1948,67 it took more than twenty
years of experimentation to devise an effective regulatory scheme.
The Clean Water Act completely revised the federal approach to
water pollution control.68 The primary control strategy of the
Clean Water Act is aimed at regulating discharges from point
sources-pipes, conduits, and other discernible conveyances
69-
through which pollutants are added to waters of the United
States. 70 Such discharges are prohibited unless the discharger
complies with a number of requirements. 71 Geographically, this
prohibition extends to most streams in the nation because Con-
67. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948).
68. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000)).
69. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
70. Id. § 1362(12). Although the Act speaks in terms of the discharge of pollu-
tants to "navigable waters," it immediately defines "navigable waters" expansively as
"waters of the United States." Compare id., with id. § 1362(7).
71. Id. § 1311(a).
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gress intended jurisdiction under the Act to be given the broadest
possible application under the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.
72
Among the requirements that apply to point source dis-
charges are several that anticipate the promulgation of nation-
ally-uniform effluent limitations that apply to all dischargers in
particular industrial categories. 73 These performance limits are
usually based upon the application of specific types of control tech-
nologies for particular waste streams: best conventional treatment
for conventional pollutants;74 best available technology for many
toxics as well as non-toxic, non-conventional pollutants like am-
monia;75 and best available demonstrated technology for new fa-
cilities. 76 For sewage treatment plants, the Act calls for secondary
treatment,77 a standard based upon reducing the oxygen demand
from organic waste and total suspended solids by 85%.78 Indus-
trial polluters who discharge into public sewage systems must
comply with pretreatment standards which apply to pollutants
that may either interfere with the functioning of the sewage treat-
ment facility or pass through with inadequate treatment. 79 These
72. "In defining 'navigable waters' to mean 'waters of the United States,' the
House-Senate conference committee wrote that it 'fully intend[ed]' to give the term
'the broadest possible constitutional interpretation.'" William L. Andreen, Developing
a More Holistic Approach to Water Management in the United States, 36 ENVTL. L.
REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,277, 10,282 n.81 (2004) (quoting S. REP. No. 92-1236, at
144 (1972)). In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the Supreme Court held, however, that
the Act's jurisdiction did not extend to isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters used
by migratory birds. More recently, in Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208
(2006) (4-1-4 decision), the Court, in a badly fractured decision, seems to have held
that non-navigable waters are subject to the Clean Water Act as long as the water in
question has a "significant nexus" to waters that are or were navigable or could rea-
sonably be so made. Id. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (stating that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds"' (quoting Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1979))).
73. By adopting uniform effluent limitations, Congress intended to eliminate any
temptation that the states might otherwise have to try to attract industry by setting
less stringent standards than their neighbors. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle,
568 F.2d 1369, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E).
75. Id. § 1311(b)(2)(A), (C), (D), (F).
76. Id. § 1316.
77. Id. § 1311(b)(1)(B).
78. See 40 C.F.R. § 133.102(a)(3) (2004).
79. 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b).
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pretreatment standards often prescribe the same effluent limits
as would apply to a polluter discharging directly into the water
body. 0
The Clean Water Act also retained and expanded a system of
state water quality standards.s Unlike uniform technology-based
effluent limitations, water quality standards are tailored to the
uses and values of specific waters. Under this system, all states
are required, subject to federal approval, to first zone their waters
for specific uses such as fish and wildlife protection and propaga-
tion or public water supply; the states must then set technical cri-
teria-maximum levels of certain chemicals, minimum levels of
dissolved oxygen, and perhaps a narrative description of the de-
sired ecosystem-which are designed to meet that use.8 2 So while
effluent limitations focus on the waste stream as it flows out of a
pipe, water quality standards focus on the overall quality of the
receiving water. This is a vital aspect of the Act's comprehensive
regulatory strategy because compliance with effluent limitations
alone does not necessarily result in good, or even adequate,
stream quality. This is not an unlikely scenario for streams re-
ceiving heavy discharges from many sources, streams with rela-
tively low flows or high use classifications, or streams that suffer
from a significant diversion or interruption of flow. For waters,
such as these, that are unable to meet water quality standards
after the application of effluent limitations, the states are to es-
tablish total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") and allocate those
pollutant loadings among the responsible sources.8 3
To implement and monitor compliance with the technology-
based limitations and any more stringent limits that may be
needed to satisfy water quality standards, every point source dis-
charger must obtain a permit and comply with its terms.8 4 These
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") per-
mits serve as a means for transforming general regulatory re-
quirements into the enforceable obligations of each individual
discharger. Although forty-five state programs have been granted
authority to issue NPDES permits,85 states must apply federal re-
quirements and are subject to an EPA veto should they fail to do
80. William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 548 (2004) [hereinafter Andreen, Water Quality Today].
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
82. Id. § 1313(c).
83. See id. § 1313(d).
84. Id. § 1311(a).
85. Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act, supra note 56, at 781.
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So.86 However, states may require compliance with permit condi-
tions that are more stringent than federal law would require.8 7
B. Federal Enforcement
The primary federal enforcement mechanisms provided by
the Act are found in section 309.81 Whenever the EPA finds that a
discharger has violated the terms of a state-issued NPDES per-
mit, section 309(a)(1) requires the agency to react in one of two
ways.8 9 One option states that the EPA "shall" notify the dis-
charger and the state government of the alleged violation.90 If the
state fails to take "appropriate enforcement action" within thirty
days, the EPA either "shall issue" an administrative compliance
order requiring the discharger to comply or "shall" refer the case
to DOJ for a civil action.91 This option recognizes that states with
an approved permit program possess primary enforcement re-
sponsibility with regard to their permits while the EPA serves as
a back-up. The second available course of action, however, recog-
nizes that federal enforcement power is concurrent with that of
the states. 92 Under this alternative, the EPA is to proceed under
section 309(a)(3), which provides that the EPA "shall" issue a com-
pliance order or refer the matter to DOJ without giving notice or
awaiting state enforcement. 93 In cases not involving the violation
of a state-issued permit, the EPA is not given the option of defer-
ring to state action. Instead, when the EPA finds a violation of a
federally-issued permit or any other requirement, it is required,
pursuant to section 309(a)(3), to issue a compliance order or refer
the case to DOJ.
94
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).
87. Id. § 1370. In addition to the NPDES program, the Clean Water Act contains
four other important programs. First, the Act prohibits the discharge of dredged or
fill material into waters of the United States, including most wetlands, without first
obtaining a section 404 permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Id.
§§ 1311(a), 1344. The second program attempts to abate non-point source pollution.
Id. § 1329. The final two programs include one that deals with unanticipated or acci-
dental spills of oil, events for which a permit system is ill-designed, and one that
provides federal financial assistance for the construction of municipally owned sew-
age treatment facilities. See Andreen, Water Quality Today, supra note 80, at 551-52.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
89. Id. § 1319(a)(1), (3).
90. See id. § 1319 (a)(1).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 1319(a)(1), (3).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 1319(a)(3).
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Although section 309(a) mandates enforcement action utiliz-
ing one of two options if the EPA finds a violation, the agency is
not required to refer cases to DOJ. Instead, section 309(b) merely
authorizes the EPA to refer civil cases to DOJ seeking injunctive
relief as well as civil penalties. 95 Section 309 also authorizes crim-
inal prosecutions for knowing or negligent violations and for viola-
tions that knowingly place individuals in imminent danger of
death or serious injury.96 A conviction under this provision sub-
jects a discharger not only to fines and imprisonment 97 but also to
debarment from federal contracting. 98 In addition to these reme-
dies, in an emergency the federal government is authorized to
bring immediate suit to abate any "pollution" that presents a dan-
ger to public health or the livelihood of individuals. 99
Congress strengthened the Act's enforcement provisions in
1987 by also providing the EPA with the authority to impose ad-
ministrative penalties for various violations.100 By doing so, Con-
gress intended to equip the EPA for "full and aggressive
enforcement."10 1 According to the Senate report, this new author-
ity would complement a tough EPA enforcement program by in-
creasing the total number of enforcement actions and by providing
greater deterrent effect than mere compliance orders for relatively
small violations.10
2
Although the EPA has multiple enforcement options in the
event it finds a violation, monitoring the compliance of every dis-
charger with its NPDES permit is a monumental task. In recogni-
tion of this heavy burden, the Clean Water Act authorizes the
agency to impose substantial monitoring and reporting require-
ments upon the regulated community. 10 3 Pursuant to this author-
ity, the EPA requires each discharger to file discharge monitoring
95. Id. § 1319(b).
96. Id. § 1319(c)(1)-(3).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 1368.
99. Id. § 1364.
100. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 314(a), 101 Stat. 7, 46 (codi-
fied as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(2000)) (adding § 309(g) to the Clean Water
Act).
101. Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water Act, supra note 56, at 778 (quoting
Senator George Mitchell).
102. S. REP. No. 99-50, at 26 (1985). See Rechtschaffen, Enforcing the Clean Water
Act, supra note 56, at 778-79 (amplifying the legislative history of EPA's administra-
tive penalty power).
103. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a).
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reports ("DMRs") on a monthly or quarterly basis. 10 4 Since the
DMRs set forth a discharger's permitted levels and its actual per-
formance, the determination of permit violations is in many cases
a relatively simple matter. Realizing that tampering with the
monitoring equipment or misreporting the results might prove an
overwhelming temptation to some dischargers, the EPA prose-
cutes such violations vigorously as a deterrent to such conduct.' 0 5
The majority of the EPA's enforcement work is done in the
agency's ten regional offices. These offices are responsible for the
conduct of most administrative enforcement and the development
of most civil and criminal cases for referral to DOJ.1° 6 The head-
quarters' Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
("OECA") takes a larger role in some cases involving federal facili-
ties and the Toxic Substances Control Act;10 7 in cases involving
multi-regional or company-wide enforcement projects where facili-
ties are located in more than one EPA region; and, more generally,
in cases involving issues of national significance.10 8 OECA also
develops agency enforcement guidance, sets priorities, and coordi-
nates regulatory development with the agency's program of-
fices. 10 9 When cases are referred to DOJ by an EPA office, they
generally go to the Environmental Enforcement Section or the En-
vironmental Crimes Section located within DOJ's Environment
and Natural Resources Division ("ENRD") in Washington, D.C.
The U.S. Attorney's offices in some of the nation's largest metro-
politan areas, however, will bring some civil cases.110 Addition-
104. See Andreen, Clean Water Act Enforcement, supra note 11, at 217.
105. See PERCIVAL, supra note 57, at 933.
106. See ROBERT L. GLiCKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POL-
icy 934-35 (2003).
107. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
108. See Memorandum from Robert I. Van Heuvelen, Dir., Office of Regulatory En-
forcement, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Deputy Reg'l Adm'rs et al., U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency (Nov. 8, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/
civil]rcra/civjudadmcase-mem.pdf, Joel Mintz, Civil Enforcement, in 1 ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW § 12.04 (Michael Gerrard ed.,
2005); John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement:
Process, Actors, and Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 10, 11 (2004).
109. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SPECIAL RE-
PORT: CONGRESSIONAL REQUEST ON EPA ENFORCEMENT RESOURCES AND ACCOMPLISH-
MENTS 31-32 (Oct. 10, 2003).
110. See Mintz, Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, supra note 42, at
10,405-06.
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ally, most criminal cases are instituted by the relevant U.S.
Attorney with assistance from ENRD and the EPA.""
C. Citizen Suit Enforcement
In order to augment government enforcement and sometimes
goad the government into acting, the Clean Water Act gives pri-
vate persons access to the courts to enforce the pollution control
requirements of the Clean Water Act. 112 Section 505 of the Act
authorizes any citizen to commence a civil action against a pol-
luter who is allegedly violating a discharge permit, government-
issued compliance order, or any other "effluent standard or limita-
tion."11 3 Such cases may be brought in federal district courts,
which possess jurisdiction to enjoin violations, impose civil penal-
ties 1 4 (payable to the U.S. Treasury), 1 5 and award attorney's fees
to prevailing or substantially prevailing litigants. 116 Many citizen
suits settle, however, with the entry of a consent decree, which
will often stipulate the payment of funds to a local environmental
activity, a compliance schedule, the payment of attorney's fees,
and a civil penalty."
7
Although the Clean Water Act grants private citizens access
to the courts, at least sixty days before filing suit, a private plain-
tiff must give notice of the violation to the EPA, the state, and the
discharger. 118 This notification is intended to give the pollution
control agencies an opportunity to enforce the law before allowing
a citizen suit to proceed. 119 If at the end of sixty days, the EPA or
111. See generally, Cruden & Gelber, supra note 108; Steven P. Solow, Preventing
an Environmental Violation from Becoming a Criminal Case, 18 NAT. RES. & ENv'T. 19
(2004).
112. See Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Law
Part I, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,309, 10,310 (1983). For an exploration
of the policy reasons supporting citizen suit enforcement, see May, Trends, supra note
48, at 5-8; Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The
Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 107-13
(2005). For a discussion of perceived disadvantages of citizen suits, see also id. at
114-20.
113. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (2000).
114. Id. § 1365(a).
115. Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 173 (2000).
116. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
117. Duke K. McCall, Clean Water Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK 291,
353 (Thomas F. P. Sullivan ed., 2005).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
119. S. REP. No. 92-414, at 79-80 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. 1972, supra note
5, at 1497-98; 118 CONG. REc. 33,699-700 (1972), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY




a state agency is not diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal ac-
tion or an administrative penalty action, the citizen may com-
mence the suit.12° While one might think that this notice
provision would often shame the government into taking tough ac-
tion, it has often been used, in a rather perverse fashion, "to blunt
more vigorous citizen enforcement efforts." 121 As Professor David
Hodas has observed, many state enforcement actions are
prompted by the desire of polluters, after receiving notice, to pre-
clude imminent citizen suits by having the state enforce against
them instead. 122 This is because they anticipate and generally re-
ceive more lenient treatment from state authorities than from
courts addressing private actions.
123
In addition to notice limitations and possible preclusion by
government enforcement activity, private citizens may not bring
suits for wholly past violations. Instead, to obtain standing, a
plaintiff must base his or her suit upon a good faith allegation of
continuous or intermittent violations.124 If a discharger comes
into compliance after the filing of the case, the granting of injunc-
tive relief may become moot but civil penalties may still be as-
sessed for all past violations, including those that occurred prior
to the commencement of suit.'
25
According to Professor James May "citizen suit litigation is
best suited for the intrepid."1 26 Dealing with the various statutory
and constitutional issues such as jurisdiction, standing, preclusion
and mootness can be difficult and expensive and an award of at-
torneys' fees is anything but sure.1 2
7
120. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(b)(1)(B), 1319(g)(6).
121. Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation, supra note 21, at 1351.
122. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1621-22 (1995).
See also Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation, supra note 21, at 1351-
52 (describing the same phenomenon at work in California).
123. See Hodas, supra note 122, at 1622.
124. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 64
(1987).
125. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 187-88 (2000).
126. May, Trends, supra note 48, at 9.
127. Id. at 9, 38-39.
2007]
86 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
III. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE HISTORY OF
EPA ENFORCEMENT
A. Sensitivity to the Changing Political Scene
In a recent article, Professor Joel Mintz perceptively observed
that one generally unrecognized characteristic of EPA enforce-
ment is "its high sensitivity to staff-level perceptions and con-
cerns."128 He quotes a former EPA regional official as saying:
The people [at the EPA] who work on enforcement are very sen-
sitive to signals about what they are doing. Because enforce-
ment has always been.., controversial and contentious, it is...
critical that the people working on it have entirely clear signals
that enforcement is important, . . . and that the people who do
the work will be supported. Those signals have to come from the
top.
1 2 9
Ambiguous signals from the top can easily be read by the staff
as a kind of coded message expressing reluctance about, perhaps
even hostility towards, enforcement. Hence, as a senior EPA en-
forcement official recently recounted:
The current [Bush] administration would typically say[:] "Oh, I
want you to enforce, but can you please check in with us before
you do any major new cases, e.g., concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs)." That was taken by the staff as a directive
not to enforce .... [Former EPA Administrator Christine Todd]
Whitman also sent her political staffers out to check on particu-
lar cases. That also chilled enforcement. 130
The consequence, of course, was a severe downturn in EPA
enforcement from 2002 to 2003.131 While one would expect en-
forcement personnel to scrutinize the language and action of the
agency's political appointees, it is a little surprising that it ap-
pears so easy at times for the agency's top brass to intentionally or
even unintentionally slow down EPA enforcement.
Mixed signals produced confusion in the EPA's ranks during
the early years of the Clinton administration. Although the EPA's
new political leadership probably did not intend to interfere with
128. Mintz, Enforcement During the Bush II Administration, supra note 47, at
10,914.
129. Id. (quoting David A. Ullrich).
130. Id. at 10,915 (quoting Sylvia Lowrance).
131. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
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traditional enforcement work, 132 their emphasis on compliance as-
sistance and various incentive programs-clearly encouraged by
the anti-regulatory furor on Capitol Hill-caused many staff
members to believe that the use of deterrent-based enforcement
tools had suddenly fallen out of favor.133 Nevertheless, traditional
enforcement levels remained high during the first two years of the
Clinton administration,13 4 perhaps because the administration
also sent a strong contrary signal when it initiated a reorganiza-
tion in 1993 that consolidated the agency's headquarters enforce-
ment staff into one centralized office. 135 The reorganization
process, however, slowed the agency's enforcement momentum be-
cause the process was chaotic, damaged morale in some portions
of the program, and resulted in a number of inconsistent organiza-
tional approaches at the regional level.136 In the midst of this con-
fusion came the election in 1994 of Republican majorities in both
houses of Congress. Their subsequent efforts to dismantle envi-
ronmental law and slice the EPA's budget were not ambiguous
and had a real "chilling effect" on EPA enforcement. 137 A high-
ranking EPA enforcement official recalls that:
People got scared that their reputation among Congress was
that they were heavy handed and beat up on the little guys.
This created a tough environment for [EPA] enforcement to be
aggressive. The Agency's reaction was to be cautious not to do
anything that would get it negative publicity. 138
This caution, fear perhaps, and a steep decline in staff mo-
rale 39 led to the precipitous drop in traditional enforcement activ-
ity in 1995 and 1996.140
There was nothing ambiguous about the signals that EPA en-
forcement received during the early years of the Reagan adminis-
tration. As a candidate for President, Ronald Reagan called for a
132. See Mintz, Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, supra note 42, at
10,393.
133. See id. at 10,393-94.
134. See 1997 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 44, at A-3 to A-5.
135. See Current Developments, 24 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 547 (July 30, 1993).
136. See Mintz, Enforcement During the Clinton Administration, supra note 42, at
10,395-98.
137. Id. at 10,400 (quoting Nancy Marvel, a veteran EPA regional enforcement
attorney).
138. Id. (quoting Ann Lassiter).
139. See id. at 10,399-401.
140. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
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reduction in environmental regulation. 141 Anne Gorsuch, his first
appointee as Administrator of the EPA, quickly set out to bring
about "regulatory reform" at the agency. Her new leadership
team "went out of its way to suggest that the EPA bureaucracy
was a large part of the agency's problem." 142 Hit lists were circu-
lated identifying pro-environmental career employees who ought
to be dismissed. 143 There were rumors that enforcement attor-
neys were about to be fired 144-a rumor given credence by deep
budget cuts, 145 a series of reorganizations that dismantled the
EPA's unified enforcement organization, 146 and ominous meetings
that were called to present the procedures to be followed in the
event of a reduction in force.1 47 As a result, morale plummeted,
and hundreds of dedicated civil servants left the agency.
148
Not surprisingly, the EPA's enforcement program fell into
chaos. 149 The faltering program did not regain an even keel until
William Ruckelshaus, who had served as the EPA's first Adminis-
trator and was highly respected in the environmental community,
took over following the resignation of the scandal-plagued Gor-
such. 150 Ruckelshaus was dedicated to restoring both the credibil-
ity of the agency and a strong enforcement program. During his
confirmation hearings, Ruckelshaus told the Senate committee
that "[tihe environmental laws of this country were passed by
Congress and were meant to be taken seriously by the administer-
ing authorities .... We will enforce the law of this country. We
141. See Henry C. Kenski & Margaret Corgan Kenski, Congress Against the Presi-
dent: The Struggle Over the Environment, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s:
REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA 97 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1984).
142. Robert W. Crandall & Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy, in NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE REAGAN APPROACH 62 (Paul R. Portney ed.,
1984).
143. See id.; JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRA-
TION'S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 36-39 (1984); Interview with William D. Ruckel-
shaus, Administrator, EPA (Jan. 1993), available at http://www.epa.gov/history/
publications/print/ruck.htm.
144. See MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA, supra note 29, at 43.
145. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
146. See MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA, supra note 29, at 43; LASH, supra note
143, at 45-53.
147. The author, then an Assistant Regional Counsel for the agency in its Atlanta,
Georgia, office, attended such a meeting in 1982. He also attended a speech by Ad-
ministrator Gorsuch where she insisted that EPA could "do more, with less."
148. See GOODMAN & WRIGHTSON, supra note 31, at 130.
149. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.




will be firm, and we will be fair."151 Despite this clear statement,
it took Ruckelshaus over six months 152 and the issuance of even
clearer signals before the intimidation-induced lassitude of the
prior years could be replaced by a renewed sense of enforcement
vigor. 15
3
Rather than a difficult-to-control guerilla, EPA enforcement
through the years has more resembled an insecure individual who
seeks approval and obtains a sense of self-worth from those in po-
sitions of authority. It has, therefore, been all too easy for political
appointees or a hostile Congress to side-track this enforcement
program from a path of tough, but fair enforcement of the law.
B. The Role of Discretion in Traditional, Deterrence-
Based EPA Enforcement
Traditional EPA enforcement has been quite flexible, contain-
ing aspects not only of a traditional deterrence-based approach to
enforcement but also of a more cooperative approach. The major-
ity of water pollution violations, therefore, have been addressed
through negotiation and informal processes-with most violations
resulting in no formal sanctions. 54 In adopting this type of flexi-
bility, EPA enforcement has taken advantage of a wide range of
informal enforcement tools, including telephone calls, meetings,
warning letters, and notices of violation. 155 One fairly recent
study concluded that nearly 70% of the EPA's enforcement re-
sponses under the Clean Water Act were informal, 56 clearly indi-
cating that the agency reserved more formal tools (such as
administrative orders, administrative penalties, and civil refer-
rals) for more serious offenses. Thus, EPA enforcers have not rig-
idly enforced the law "in a one-size-fits-all approach.' 57 Rather
they have generally responded in a flexible, pragmatic way and
tried to tailor their approach to the nature of the problem. Addi-
151. Nomination of William D. Ruckelshaus: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Env't and Pub. Works, 98th Cong. 191 (1983).
152. See Bud Ward, Reflections, ENVTL. FORUM, Apr. 1984, at 2.
153. See Transcript of William D. Ruckelshaus' Remarks to EPA Nat'l Compliance
and Enforcement Conference, ENVTL. FORUM, Apr. 1984, at 14-15.
154. See Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation, supra note 21, at
1330.
155. See id. at 1331.
156. See SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, ENFORCING THE LAw: THE CASE
OF THE CLEAN WATER ACTS (BUREAUCRACIES, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND PUBLIC
POLICY) 53-57, 72-73 (1996) (including such things as no action, comments, telephone
calls, conferences, notice letters, warning letters, and notices of violation).
157. Rechtschaffen, Promoting Pragmatic Risk Regulation, supra note 21, at 1334.
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tionally, while the agency has tried to guide the exercise of this
discretion through the issuance of guidance documents, the deci-
sion about whether to enforce and how to enforce lies largely
within the enforcer's discretion. 158
C. The Move Towards Even More Flexibility:
Compliance Assistance and Incentives
In the early 1990s, the EPA began to recognize a more explicit
role for a cooperation-based approach to compliance. In doing so,
the EPA expanded its ability to provide compliance assistance to
regulated entities. This type of assistance has involved such
things as workshops, seminars, on-site assistance, compliance
guides, the development of ten internet-based compliance assis-
tance centers, and the launch of a compliance assistance clearing-
house. 159 At approximately the same time, the EPA began to
initiate a number of compliance incentive programs designed to
encourage dischargers to self-audit their facilities and correct vio-
lations before they are discovered by government inspectors.
160
The EPA's primary compliance incentive program seems well-
designed. Unlike many state audit programs, the EPA does not
grant immunity from enforcement for violations reported by the
regulated entity itself.'6 ' In addition, no privilege from disclosure
is granted for materials generated during self-audits. 162 However,
while such programs are appropriately administered by the
agency's enforcement staff-as they involve the exercise of en-
158. See id. at 1335.
159. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2001 ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISH-
MENTS REPORT 13 (2002) [hereinafter 2001 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT].
160. The EPA may forego gravity-based penalties in cases where small businesses
make a good faith effort to comply by discovering and promptly disclosing violations
and then correcting them within six months. Small Business Compliance Policy, 65
Fed. Reg. 19,630, 19,632-34 (Apr. 11, 2000). Under the more generic incentives, dis-
chargers who detect, promptly disclose and correct violations within sixty days (or as
expeditiously as possible) can qualify for a waiver or significant reduction in gravity-
based civil penalties. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction
and Prevention of Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,619-22 (Apr. 11, 2000). Dis-
chargers, however, are still potentially liable for penalties that represent any eco-
nomic gain they obtained from noncompliance. Id. at 19,620. The policy, moreover,
does not apply to violations of administrative orders or consent decrees or to viola-
tions that cause serious harm to the environment. Id. at 19,623. For a more thorough
discussion of EPA's compliance incentive and assistance strategies, see Markell,
supra note 56, at 14-29.
161. Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention




forcement discretion-compliance assistance programs appear
out-of-place in the enforcement context.
This is not to say that the EPA should not be providing com-
pliance assistance to small businesses and communities. That
kind of effort seems entirely proper, designed as it is to encourage
compliance by explaining regulatory requirements to smaller, less
sophisticated entities. It also tends to build goodwill for the
agency.163 Nevertheless, the task should not be assigned to the
enforcement program since compliance assistance by its very na-
ture is a pre-enforcement endeavor. 164 Instead, these tasks
should be performed by the program offices that are responsible
for issuing NPDES permits, overseeing state-issued permits, and
developing regulatory standards. In its current location, the task
of assisting regulated entities with compliance dilutes the focus of
what should be a professional law enforcement office and siphons
needed resources from that effort. Indeed, it seems more than a
little bizarre for an enforcement program to hold out the total
number of "hits" its compliance webpage receives 165 as an indica-
tion of enforcement vigor. By the time a matter is sent to the en-
forcement office, the time for coaxing and persuasion should be
over.
In addition to siphoning resources, compliance assistance pro-
grams can also lead to enforcement "timidity and inaction" if they
are used to undermine or replace "a vigorous, evenhanded pro-
gram of deterrent enforcement."1 6 6 Although the inauguration of
such programs at the EPA caused more than a little confusion
among the enforcement staff, and their operation continues to di-
vert scarce resources, it does not appear that they have under-
mined traditional EPA enforcement. The situation at the state
level, however, is not so clear.
Since the early 1990s, the states have also placed an empha-
sis upon compliance assistance and incentive programs. 67 They
163. See Joel A. Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental Enforcement: A Comment on a
Recent Discussion at the AALS, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,639, 10,642
(2000) [hereinafter Mintz, AALS Enforcement Discussion].
164. See id. at 10,642.
165. See, e.g., 2001 EPA ENFORCEMENT REPORT, supra note 159, at 13 (touting the
number of times that business visited internet-based EPA compliance assistance
centers).
166. Mintz, AALS Enforcement Discussion, supra note 163, at 10,642.
167. See Clifford Rechtschaffen & David L. Markell, Improving State Environmen-
tal Enforcement Performance Through Enhanced Government Accountability and
Other Strategies, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,559 (2003).
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have often gone further than the EPA, however, with environmen-
tal audit laws that grant immunity from enforcement, and stat-
utes that render audit information privileged information, which
is unavailable to law enforcers. 168 It also appears that many
states have taken one additional step and actually replaced, to one
extent or another, traditional enforcement mechanisms with some
form of cooperation-based strategy. As a result, state enforcement
numbers have fallen rather steadily since 1993.169
The new, more flexible approach to environmental enforce-
ment has not improved rates of compliance with the Clean Water
Act. Instead, those rates have remained stubbornly static over the
last decade. In fiscal year 1994, about 17% of major dischargers
were in significant noncompliance with their NPDES permits. 170
In fiscal year 1998, however, over 20% were in significant noncom-
pliance. 171 Similarly, from fiscal years 2003 to 2005, the average
was 19.7%.172 Moreover, as Professor David Markell has pointed
out, these major dischargers "represent only the tip of the ice-
berg."'1 73 There are only about 7000 major dischargers as opposed
to over 80,000 minor NPDES permit holders and some 200,000
stormwater dischargers. 174 Since major dischargers are inspected
far more often and receive a disproportionate amount of regula-
168. See Joel. A. Mintz, The Uncertain Future Path of Environmental Enforcement
and Compliance: A Book Review Essay Regarding Clifford Rechtschaffen and David
L. Markell, Reinventing Environmental Enforcement and the State-Federal Relation-
ship, 33 ENVTL. L. 1093, 1098 (2003). EPA minced no words when it concluded that
state audit privilege and immunity statutes "are unnecessary, undermine law en-
forcement, impair protection of human health and the environment, and interfere
with the public's right to know of potential and existing environmental hazards." In-
centives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Viola-
tions, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,623 (Apr. 11, 2000).
169. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
170. See Markell, supra note 56, at 55. Significant noncompliance is defined to
include major violations of permit limitations, violations of court orders, violations of
effluent limitations established by an administrative order, failure to submit dis-
charge monitoring reports, and unauthorized bypasses. Memorandum from Steven A.
Herman, Assistant Adm'r, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, to the
Water Mgmt. Div. Dirs. & Reg'l Counsels (Sept. 21, 1995) (on file with Pace Environ-
mental Law Review).
171. See Markell, supra note 56, at 56.
172. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, END OF FISCAL YEAR 2005 REPORTING FOR SECTION 106 GRANT PROGRAM
ANALYSIS AND RATING TOOL MEASURE: PERCENT OF MAJOR NPDES PERMITrEES IN SIG-
NIFICANT NONCOMPLIANCE (SNC) AT ANY TIME DURING THE FISCAL YEAR (2006), availa-
ble at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/reports/nets/fy2005/netsO5-npdes-
snc.pdf.
173. Markell, supra note 56, at 56.
174. See id. at 56-57.
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tory attention, 175 one would expect their compliance rates to be
much higher. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the overall rate
of significant noncompliance is quite high indeed. It is also fair to
conclude that a great deal of enforcement work remains to be
done. 176
IV. MOTIVATING ENFORCEMENT THROUGH
INTERNAL CULTURAL NORMS
The EPA enforcement program is comprised of men and wo-
men who are talented professionals, dedicated to their jobs and
the task of environmental protection. They do their work well; yet
they generally fail to receive any praise from Congress, the top
political levels of the EPA, the press, or the environmental com-
munity. It is-except from the standpoint of self-satisfaction-a
rather thankless job. Moreover, they are often treated as second-
class citizens by at least some lawyers at the Department of Jus-
tice, 1 77 where a stronger sense of esprit d'corps holds sway.
The unsung heroes at the EPA also feel vulnerable to the
shifting tides of political fortune since their professional role
within the agency has been and will always be subject to tough
criticism from industry, many state agencies, and those who hold
a contrary view about the value of deterrence-based enforcement
or even the value of environmental regulation. Even today, many
businesses still consider significant elements of the environmental
regulatory regime to be "illegitimate,"'178 and the enforcement pro-
gram, in many cases, receives the brunt of their ire. In short, the
program is a lightning rod for the anti-regulatory critique, both
within and without government. It is little wonder then that en-
forcement personnel look to high agency officials for reassurance
about the value of their role, and their insecurity appears to be
greatest during the early years of a presidential administration.
175. See id. at 57.
176. An EPA study has detected a correlation, albeit somewhat modest, between
enforcement and compliance levels. According to the report, fourteen out of the
twenty-three states with the lowest enforcement activity also had the worst levels of
compliance. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, A PILOT FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF
THE NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM 27 (2003).
177. See Mintz, Enforcement During the Bush I Administration, supra note 47, at
10,924 (noting that EPA regional attorneys have the perception that some lawyers at
DOJ view themselves as "superior" to EPA lawyers).
178. CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMEN-
TAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 217 (2003).
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Clear signals that a new administration or a new Congress
disfavors vigorous enforcement have certainly stymied enforce-
ment efforts in the past. 179 Even more ambiguous messages at
such times have succeeded in slowing enforcement as staff mem-
bers seek direction from the top of the agency. 1 0 The lesson for
administrations that want to encourage vigorous enforcement is
obvious: demonstrate in words and deeds the fact that the admin-
istration is committed to enforcing the laws of this country as
written by Congress.
However, it is also clear that the EPA's enforcement program
should be internally motivated to consistently uphold and enforce
the law. While administrations have discretion to make some pol-
icy choices which the staff must take care to follow, those policy
decisions are constrained by the rule of law. Consequently, while
administrations may choose to undertake new initiatives and
strategies to enforce the law, they may not use the enforcement
program to undercut laws with which they disagree, for the
agency's authority is predicated upon the concomitant duty to pro-
tect the beneficiaries of the nation's environmental laws, includ-
ing the Clean Water Act.
The EPA enforcement program is well-positioned to be the
first bulwark against any politically-motivated attempt to under-
mine enforcement. The EPA's enforcement lawyers and engineers
are public servants whose primary role and obligation lies in the
area of law enforcement. Their tradition, therefore, should reflect
unfailing fidelity to the law and the ideals of professional law en-
forcement. The resulting ethos should include firmness, fairness
in dealing with the regulated community, and responsiveness to
the lawful wishes of the agency's political appointees. Good faith,
high ethical values, moderation, and professional competence-all
of these are additional values which should inform and guide such
a professional law enforcement program.' 8 '
179. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
181. See generally Joel L. Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights:
What Went Wrong, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 786-95 (describing the culture of profes-
sionalism in the Civil Rights Division at the U.S. Department of Justice); Douglas
Letter, Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I Ask for Is a Little
Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1295, 1300 (1993) (stating that federal courts impose
special obligations on federal lawyers such as the responsibility for "fair dealing, full
disclosure, and allegiance to the court system").
[Vol. 24
MOTIVATING ENFORCEMENT
The professional environment of an EPA enforcement lawyer
differs significantly from that of the private bar.'8 2 Although an
enforcement lawyer's client is the agency, that lawyer also has an
obligation to the United States and to the public interest as de-
fined by Congress in statutes like the Clean Water Act.' 8 3 So con-
ceived, these agency lawyers have a responsibility, as does the
agency-regardless of the views of the agency's current political
leadership or even of the views of a current Congress-to enforce
the law. Law enforcement, after all, is not an appropriate venue
for the formulation of legally binding policy. The appropriate
venue for making such changes is in Congress through the exer-
cise of its lawmaking authority, or, in many instances, it may lie-
as the result of a delegation of authority from Congress-within
the agency's rulemaking authority. But policy-formulation in the
form of choosing not to vigorously enforce the Clean Water Act
does not rest within the prerogative of the EPA or any political
appointee. 184
I am not suggesting, however, that EPA enforcement lawyers
can shed their professional duty to the agency. The EPA is, in a
strict sense, their client in terms of professional responsibility and
discipline.8 5 Both the "public interest" and the concept of the en-
tire United States government are generally too broad, too amor-
phous in nature to have much utility in terms of the organized
182. As Judge Abner Mikva has written:
[G]overnment lawyers have obligations beyond those of private lawyers.
A government lawyer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy," the Supreme Court said long ago in a statement chiseled on
the walls of the Justice Department, "but of a sovereignty whose obliga-
tion ... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."
Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
183. Compare the remarks of former Assistant Attorney General Roger Marzulla
in The Forum: In the Hotseat at Justice, 11 THE ENVTL. FORUM, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 42
(stating that while "[tihe primary role of the Justice Department is to advance the
policies that are adopted by the governmental agencies .... the second role of the
department is to protect the Constitution, the judicial system, and the rule of law").
184. In a similar context, Professor Joel Selig has declared that: "The Department
of Justice ... is not free to decline to enforce existing law merely because of disagree-
ment with it. Fundamental precepts of separation of powers and executive branch
duty preclude any claim of discretion to ignore the law." Selig, supra note 181, at 790.
185. See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, REPORT BY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT 6, 13-15 (1988), reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CRIMINAL
LAW AND URBAN PROBLEMS COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES NUMBER C-188, 304-331 (2001)
[hereinafter PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE].
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bar's regulation of an EPA lawyer's conduct. 186 Furthermore, a
host of confidentiality and conflict issues could arise if these law-
yers actually were viewed as having, at all times, concrete profes-
sional responsibilities to three different clients-the agency, the
United States, and the public interest.18 7 Nevertheless, EPA law-
yers still possess the more general, ethical responsibility to en-
force the law as found in the Clean Water Act, and that
responsibility should inform and shape their relationship with the
agency.'188
Although EPA lawyers must ultimately take direction from
their superiors within the EPA, they can certainly be strong advo-
cates, within the agency, for a consistently firm approach to en-
forcement. They can also protest within the agency whenever an
administration attempts, directly or indirectly, to stifle enforce-
ment activity. On occasion, in egregious situations, such protests
may even have to be aired publicly. 18 9 Such public protests, in-
cluding resignations, are unpleasant events and should be limited
to rare circumstances, but a duty to speak out exists when the
public interest in law enforcement is being subverted.' 90 I am not
advocating anarchy or the violation of any professional norms of
conduct. 191 Rather, I am arguing for a moderate but resolute form
186. See id. at 10-13, reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 185, at
316-19.
187. See id. at 10-12, reprinted in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE , supra note 185, at
316-18.
188. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly recognize that "[t]he
Rules do not ... exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a
lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble 16 (2006) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
189. See Selig, supra note 181, at 786-87 (discussing the right and duty of DOJ civil
rights lawyers to protest whenever "the actions of political officials have prevented or
threatened to prevent Division attorneys from performing their law enforcement
function").
190. In such a situation, one might well be able to argue that the lawyer is no
longer representing the agency but is instead representing the paramount interests of
the public or of the United States itself. See MODEL RULES, supra note 188, at R 1.13
cmt. 9 (noting that in a situation where a government lawyer knows that a head of a
bureau is engaged in action or refuses to act in a way that violates a legal obligation
to the organization or constitutes a legal violation that is likely to result in substan-
tial injury to the organization, the lawyer's client may be viewed more broadly, pre-
sumably to avoid any possible problem associated with client confidentiality).
191. I would not, for example, anticipate any need to reveal confidential informa-
tion or information relating to any particular case. Statistics about enforcement ac-
tivity are publicly available information, the disclosure of which would not interfere
with any pending or future enforcement action. Any such public disclosures, moreo-
ver, would advance significant public policy purposes pertaining to EPA's overall en-
forcement of federal law. Cf. Letter from California State Bar Trial Counsel to
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of law enforcement professionalism-an approach that should
garner respect from any administration that is dedicated to serv-
ing the public interest as reflected in the laws of the land.
Many EPA attorneys have been exemplars of this kind of pro-
fessionalism. For instance, during the drop in enforcement activ-
ity during the early years of George W. Bush's administration, a
number of frustrated EPA enforcement officials publicly criticized
the administration's approach to enforcement as they resigned or
retired from the agency. 192 I hope that this article is viewed as
support for and an affirmation of that kind of professional
strength and integrity within the EPA's enforcement program.
I also hope that this article serves as a starting point for a
discussion of additional ways in which a strong sense of profes-
sionalism can be nurtured and sustained within the EPA's en-
forcement program. Certainly, the agency can provide more
support for and recognition of outstanding performance through
such devices as awards and bonuses. More praise can also come
from the leadership at DOJ, from individual lawyers at DOJ, from
the environmental community, from the organized bar, and from
professional engineering societies. These kinds of actions would
help foster a stronger esprit d'corps that would better equip the
program to weather the truly adverse conditions that arise from
time to time. This kind of support and recognition would also help
the agency retain those experienced lawyers who serve as role
models and mentors of the younger, more inexperienced lawyers
who often comprise a disproportionately large segment of the fed-
eral legal workforce. Other approaches, of course, should be ex-
plored such as higher pay grades, an expansion of the ranks of
senior agency litigators, the provision of more and better opportu-
nities for continuing professional education and engagement in
the activities of professional organizations, and more leave oppor-
tunities for advanced education. Finally, other commentators
may want to explore whether independent agency status, and the
Counsel for Cindy Ossias (Oct. 11, 2000), reprinted in RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M.
LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 551 (2d ed. 2002) (finding that a
government attorney's release of materials relating to the State Insurance Depart-
ment's settlement of claims against insurance companies arising out of a recent earth-
quake did not merit discipline for a number of reasons including the advancement of
public policy).
192. See Jennifer Lee, 3 Top Enforcement Officials Say They Will Leave E.P.A.,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2004, at A20; Jeff Johnson, EPA's Top Cops Resign: Enforcement
Division Head, Top Two Air Pollution Attorneys Leave EPA, CHEM. & ENG'G NEWS,
Jan. 12, 2004, at 8.
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prestige associated with some degree of independent litigation au-
thority which often goes with it,193 would better insulate the
EPA's enforcement program from future political attempts to un-
dermine it.
V. CONCLUSION
The success of the complex regulatory scheme created by the
Clean Water Act ultimately depends upon effective enforcement.
Congress was keenly aware of this fact and attempted to ease the
task by creating an enforceable regulatory structure for point
source discharges, a wide array of federal enforcement tools, and
redundant enforcement mechanisms. Nevertheless, enforcement
has faltered at critical points in the past. At the EPA, the culprit
has generally been hostility, which either the political leadership
at the agency or Congress has exhibited towards the regulatory
program created on Capitol Hill in 1972. Until this legislative
program is amended or repealed, however, it remains the law of
the land and the obligation of the EPA to enforce. The task facing
the EPA's enforcement professionals, therefore, is difficult. They
must follow the lawful policy initiatives that are launched by the
agency's political appointees. However, they also have an obliga-
tion to honor the rule of law and the highest traditions of a profes-
sional law enforcement program. The internalization of those
traditions and the fundamental values they represent should
serve both the agency and the nation well as we seek to ensure
continuity and consistency in the EPA's enforcement of the Clean
Water Act.
193. See OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., MULTI-MEMBER IN-
DEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION 3,
app. at 2-5, 7-13, 15-16, 19, 21 (May 1992); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Indepen-
dence: Solicitor General Control Over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV.
255, 278-80 (1994).
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